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Moralism	and	Realism	
	 Bernard	Williams	(2005,	1)	distinguished	between	two	models	of	political	theory:	the	
enactment	model	and	the	structural	model.2	According	to	the	former,	whose	paradigmatic	
instance	would	be	utilitarianism,	political	theory	intends	to	guide	political	action	by	
proposing	principles,	concepts,	ideals,	and	values.	In	turn,	Rawls’	theory	of	justice	would	be	
Williams’	paradigm	for	the	structural	model.	Theories	under	this	model,	in	a	more	modest	
vein,	would	not	purport	to	guide	politics,	but	still	would	impose	certain	moral	constraints	to	
what	political	actors	can	rightfully	do.	
	 Williams	exempts	us	from	choosing	between	these	two	models	by	pointing	out	that	
they	share	crucial	flaws	and	must	be	placed,	together,	on	the	wrong	side	of	the	truly	relevant	
distinction,	i.e.,	the	distinction	between	moralist	and	realist	views	of	politics.	For	Williams,	
practitioners	of	the	enactment	and	the	structural	models	would	share,	in	spite	of	all	their	
differences,	a	moralistic	conception	of	politics	and,	consequently,	a	vision	of	political	
philosophy	as	a	sort	of	applied	ethics.	
	 Williams	(2005,	3)	uses	the	term	‘political	moralism’	to	refer	to	those	‘views	that	
make	the	moral	prior	to	the	political,’	and	confronts	them	with	those	stances	that	accept	the	
existence	and	legitimacy	of	a	distinctively,	more	autonomous,	political	thought.	The	latter	
are	gathered	together	under	the	label	‘political	realism.’	Geuss	(2008,	1-7)	and	Larmore	
(2013)	formulate	this	dichotomy	as	two	different	metaphilosophical	approaches	to	the	
relationship	between	moral	philosophy	and	political	philosophy.	According	to	political	
moralism,	political	philosophy	would	be	that	chapter	of	moral	philosophy	that	focuses	on	
those	moral	principles	that	have	to	do	with	the	shape	social	life	should	ideally	have.	
Larmore’s	example	is	justice,	regarded	as	a	moral	ideal.	On	this	point	he	echoes	Rawls	(1971,	
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3),	who	stated:	‘Justice	is	the	first	virtue	of	social	institutions.’	Nevertheless,	political	
moralists	with	diverse	convictions	may	uphold	other	candidates,	like	freedom	or	happiness.	
	 Political	realists	do	not	begin	by	asking	what	ought	to	be	ideally	or	rationally	desired	
or	valued,	but	what	are	the	real	motivations	of	people	and	how	real	institutions	work	at	a	
given	time	(see	Geuss	2008,	9).	As	a	consequence,	in	Larmore	(2013,	277)	words,	political	
realism	‘sees	political	philosophy	as	an	autonomous	discipline,	setting	out	not	from	the	
truths	of	morality,	but	instead	from	those	basic	features	of	the	human	condition	that	make	
up	the	reality	of	political	life.’	Among	these	basic	features,	Larmore	(2013,	277-280)	stresses	
one	trait	that	is	of	acute	importance	for	realists:	the	ubiquitous	disagreement	among	people	
on	their	conceptions	of	the	right	and	the	good.	Since	these	conceptions	obviously	include	
moral	conceptions	of	the	right	and	the	good,	it	follows	from	Williams’	and	Larmore’s	
characterization	that,	for	the	realist,	one	of	the	tasks	for	political	philosophy	is	to	reflect	on	
the	plurality	of	moralities	that	coexist	in	many	societies	(conspicuously	in	contemporary	
societies)	and	on	how	to	handle	this	diversity	(see	Galston	2010,	400).	
	 Political	moralism	and	political	realism	don’t	need	to	be	symmetrical	views,	though:	
while	political	moralists	contend	that	morality	is	prior	to	politics,	not	every	realist	would	
straightforwardly	state	that	politics	is	always	prior	to	morality.	Williams	(2005,	8),	for	
instance,	would	not	subscribe	to	the	symmetrical	version	of	political	realism,	as	far	as	he	
admits	that	‘there	can	be	local	applications	of	moral	ideas	in	politics,	and	these	may	take,	on	
a	limited	scale,	an	enactment	or	a	structural	form.’	Unfortunately,	he	is	not	very	explicit	on	
the	conditions	under	which	these	local	applications	would	be	acceptable	for	political	realists.	
My	alternative	is	to	describe	the	situation	as	a	sort	of	‘reciprocal	containment’	of	morality	
and	politics.3	This	reciprocal	containment	is	one	of	the	main	ingredients	of	political	
minimalism.	I	explain	at	once	what	it	means.	
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The	Reciprocal	Containment	of	Morality	and	Politics	 	
Politics	encompasses	morality	as	far	as	political	actors	have	to	reckon	on	the	plurality	
of	moral	codes	that	typically	coexist	in	complex	societies.	According	to	political	realists,	
politicians	should	not	feel	committed,	when	acting	as	such,	to	obey	any	particular	moral	
code.	Instead,	they	should	take	people’s	moral	codes,	and	their	outcomes,	into	account	as	
social	facts,	as	many	other	facts	have	to	be	taken	into	account	whenever	politicians	strive	to	
achieve	political	goals.	As	Geuss	(2008,	11)	admits,	‘even	illusions	can	have	effects.’	Hence,	
political	philosophers	ought	to	take	into	account	people’s	ideals	and	moral	stances,	but	only	
insofar	as	these	have	influence	on	their	behavior	(Geuss	2008,	9).	
As	a	consequence	of	these	claims	by	Geuss	and	other	realists,	in	political	contexts	
political	requirements	would	be	prior	to	moral	considerations;	also	to	those	moral	
considerations	stemming	from	that	subfield	of	philosophical	or	academic	reflection	on	moral	
issues	for	which	the	term	‘ethics’	is	sometimes	reserved.	So	far,	political	minimalism	agrees	
with	political	realism.	
	 On	the	other	hand,	a	political	minimalist	would	admit	that	morality	‘contains’	politics	
in	a	sense,	since	anybody	may	evaluate	political	actions	from	his	or	her	own	moral	stance,	as	
we	often	do.	Now,	it	is	important	to	note	that	when	doing	so	one	does	not	see	oneself	just	
evaluating	politics	from	one	of	the	many	moral	codes	that	happen	to	coexist	in	our	society:	
we	produce	moral	statements	that	we	think	are	true,	and	prescriptions	that	we	take	to	be	
correct.	When	morality	contains	politics,	we	arrive	at	one	of	those	situations	in	which	
morality	becomes	ethics.	When,	conversely,	morality	is	encompassed	by	politics	the	
situation	is	very	different;	morality	is	then	just	the	addition	of	the	many	moralities	that	
people	in	fact	hold:	those	moralities	that	are	dispassionately	described	by	historians,	
sociologists,	anthropologists,	and	political	scientists.	
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	 We	have,	then,	stated	the	platitude	that	politics	is	prior	to	morality	from	the	political	
point	of	view,	and	the	platitude	that	morality	is	prior	to	politics	from	the	moral	point	of	view.	
Such	platitudes,	though,	are	often	forgotten	in	the	debates	between	political	realists	and	
political	moralists.	Now	let	us	have	a	look	at	the	history	of	political	moralism	and	political	
realism	to	search	for	some	more	mistakes.	
	
Lessons	from	History:	(1)	Political	Moralism	
Recall	Bernard	Williams’	definition	of	the	political	moralist	as	someone	who	makes	
morals	prior	to	politics.	Given	this	definition,	Kant	would	be,	for	many,	the	paradigm	of	a	
modern	political	moralist.	Not	in	vain	he	famously	stated:	‘All	politics	must	bend	its	knee	
before	the	right’	(Kant	1970,	124).	This	means	that,	according	to	Kant	(1970,	121),	political	
maxims	must	be	derived	from	the	pure	concept	of	the	duty	of	right,	whose	principle	is	
provided	a	priori	through	pure	reason,	instead	of	starting	from	the	ideas	of	prosperity	and	
happiness.	Although	people	might	be	inclined	to	believe	that	it	is	the	duty	of	the	sovereign	to	
look	after	the	happiness	of	the	subjects,	this	could	not	be	the	case,	Kant	(2006,	52)	argues,	
because	each	subject,	and	also	the	sovereign,	can	hold	a	different	conception	of	happiness.	In	
other	words,	there	is	no	universally	valid	principle	concerning	happiness	that	might	be	
taken	as	a	law,	and	any	government	willing	to	impose	its	own	conception	of	happiness	on	its	
subjects	deserves	the	title	of	‘despotic’	(Kant	2006,	55–56).	
	 The	sovereign	should	let	the	subjects	pursue	happiness	according	to	each	one’s	idea	
of	it.	In	fact,	the	sovereign	should	promote	the	freedom	of	each	individual	to	choose	his	or	
her	conception	of	happiness.	Contrary	to	happiness,	freedom	is	a	universally	valid	goal,	and	
so	an	adequate	aim	for	politics.	This	is	how,	for	Kant,	morality	provides	politics	its	main	aim,	
and	this	is	freedom.4	
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	 Kant’s	layout	for	political	philosophy	seems	solid,	but	there	is	something	really	tricky	
at	its	very	foundations.	To	see	the	trick,	we	need	to	look	at	three	different	contexts	in	which	
Kant	talks	of	freedom.	The	first,	close	to	traditional	metaphysical	debates	on	free	will,	is	the	
discussion	of	what	Kant	(1996,	473-478)	calls	‘freedom	in	the	transcendental	sense’,	
addressed	in	the	Third	Antinomy	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	(A	444–A	451).	The	second	
context	arises	whenever	transcendental	freedom	is	linked	to	moral	agency	through	the	claim	
that	a	rational	being	is	autonomous.	This	means	that	a	rational	being	is	free	as	far	as	a	law,	of	
which	such	a	being	is	the	author,	binds	him	or	her.	For	this	capacity	for	self-legislation	
makes	a	rational	being	a	suitable	member	in	a	possible	realm	of	ends	and	hence	free	in	
regard	to	natural	laws	(Kant	2002,	53-54;	Ak	4:435–Ak	4:436).	Freedom	in	this	context	is	
close	to	Isaiah	Berlin’s	(1969,	130)	concept	of	positive	liberty:	one	is	free,	according	to	Kant,	
not	because	one	does	what	one	pleases,	but	because	one	obeys	a	rational	law,	being	the	
rational	criterion	for	moral	laws	the	categorical	imperative.	Morality	is	thus	conceived	as	a	
realm	of	non-instrumental	rationality	and	(positive)	freedom.	It	is	before	moral	norms	so	
understood	that	all	politics	must	bend	its	knee,	as	I	quoted	above.	
	 But	there	is	still	a	third	context	in	which	Kant	(2006,	45)	talks	of	freedom,	namely,	
when	he	refers	to	political	freedom,	understood	as	follows:	
	
No	one	can	force	me	to	be	happy	in	his	way	(according	to	how	he	conceives	the	
welfare	of	other	human	beings),	rather	each	may	pursue	happiness	in	the	way	that	he	
sees	fit,	as	long	as	he	does	not	infringe	on	the	freedom	of	others	to	pursue	a	similar	
end,	which	can	coexist	with	the	freedom	of	everyone	in	accordance	with	a	possible	
general	law	(that	is,	with	the	same	right	of	another).	
	
This	concept	of	freedom	is	close	to	Berlin’s	(1969,	122)	notion	of	negative	freedom.	
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The	trick	is	that	negative	freedom	is	justified	as	the	main	political	goal	because	positive	
freedom	deserves	unconditional	respect.	It	does	not	make	sense	to	say	that	the	state	should	
promote	positive	freedom	because	such	kind	of	freedom	is	not,	for	Kant,	an	attribute	of	
persons	as	empirical	beings,	but	as	rational	beings,	and	rational	beings	will	continue	to	be	
free	in	the	transcendental	sense	no	matter	the	circumstances.	On	the	other	hand,	the	state	
can	indeed	protect	and	constrain	individual	actions	in	pursuit	of	each	one’s	conception	of	
happiness,	but	this	pursuit	is	an	exercise	of	instrumental	rationality,	and	it	is	not	clear	at	all	
why	this	aim,	rather	than	happiness	or	some	other,	should	be	taken	as	the	main	goal	of	
politics.	Kant	(2003,		23),	true,	could	try	to	justify	this	move	by	means	of	his	distinction	
between	the	matter	of	choice	(‘that	is,	(...)	the	end	each	has	in	mind	with	the	object	he	
wants’)	and	its	form	(‘insofar	as	choice	is	regarded	merely	as	free,	and	whether	the	action	of	
one	can	be	united	with	the	freedom	of	the	other	in	accordance	with	a	universal	law’).	This	
distinction	allows	him,	indeed,	to	say	that	although	what	the	state	protects	is	the	right	of	
each	subject	to	live	according	to	his	or	her	conception	of	happiness,	it	is	not	any	particular	
conception	of	happiness,	but	freedom,	that	is	being	protected.	But	one	may	ask	why	is	the	
form	of	freedom	so	valuable,	if	we	are	not	talking	of	positive	freedom,	but	of	negative	
freedom.	
	 Kant	is	right	when	he	acknowledges	the	existence	of	many	different	conceptions	of	
individual	happiness,	and	grants	their	legitimacy.	But	he	is	missing	two	additional	
ingredients	of	what	I	take	to	be	the	right	recipe.	One	is	the	recognition	that	there	is	not	only	
a	plurality	of	ways	for	understanding	happiness,	but	also	a	plurality	of	political	aims,	among	
which	happiness	is	only	one	instance.	The	second	is	the	conception	of	politics	as	an	art	of	
instrumental	rationality,	as	the	art	of	reconciling	the	diverse	political	aims	that	people	
pursue	(happiness,	justice,	freedom,	and	so	on)	and	the	diverse	ways	of	understanding	each	
of	them.	I	shall	come	back	to	this	recipe	later.	Anyway,	this	solution	is	precluded	to	Kant,	
	 8	
because	he	chooses	to	subordinate	politics	to	morality	after	forgetting	that	political	freedom	
is	the	negative,	conflicting	freedom	of	flesh	and	blood	people,	and	not	the	positive	freedom	
of	the	rational	moral	being.	
	
Lessons	from	History:	(2)	Political	Realism	
Let	us	now	turn	our	eyes	to	Hobbes.	There	seems	to	be	little	to	say	about	Hobbes	that	
has	not	been	said	already,	but	of	the	many	well-known	facts	about	him	a	few	are	worth	
recalling	for	the	purposes	of	this	essay.	Let	us	begin	with	this:	Leviathan,	Hobbes’	most	
influential	book,	was	completed	in	Paris	by	1650,	some	eight	years	after	the	English	Civil	
War	had	broken	out.	Although	some	of	the	theses	defended	by	Hobbes	in	this	book	had	been	
advanced	in	his	previous	treatise	The	Elements	of	Law,	Natural	and	Politic	(1640),	it	is	also	
true	that	while	writing	this	older	book	Hobbes	was	impressed	by	the	internal	divisions	and	
discontent	he	found	in	England	when	he	went	back	home	in	1637,	after	one	of	his	stays	in	
France.	Moreover,	Hobbes	devoted	one	full	book	to	tell	the	story	of	the	English	civil	war,5	
witnessed	the	Thirty	Years	War	(which	started	on	the	Continent	when	Hobbes	was	30	years	
old),	and	claimed	in	his	Autobiography	that	he	was	born	prematurely	when	his	mother	heard	
of	the	impending	invasion	of	the	Spanish	Armada.6	Those	were	risky	times	indeed:	no	
wonder	political	order	and	security	were	Hobbes’	priorities.	These	were	also	the	priorities	
for	Machiavelli,	another	inspirer	of	political	realism,	who	had	witnessed,	more	or	less	one	
century	before	Hobbes,	the	consequences	of	war	and	political	instability	in	Italy,	and	who	
wished,	as	much	as	Hobbes,	to	live	in	a	unified	state	ruled	by	a	strong	sovereign.7	
	 I	am	not	claiming,	of	course,	that	Hobbes	and	Machiavelli’s	ideas	were	completely	
determined	by	the	political	context:	other	enlightened	minds	with	similar	social	origins	
witnessed	the	same	events	without	drawing	the	same	conclusions.	But	it	is	timely	to	recall	
these	facts	in	order	to	discuss	one	of	the	favored	arguments	for	political	realism:	the	
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argument	of	political	order	as	a	‘necessary	condition’	for	political	life.	Williams	(2005,	3)	
advances	this	argument	as	follows:	
	
I	identify	the	‘first’	political	question	in	Hobbesian	terms	as	the	securing	of	order,	
protection,	safety,	trust,	and	the	conditions	for	cooperation.	It	is	‘first’	because	solving	
it	is	the	condition	of	solving,	indeed	posing,	any	others.	
	
	 One	can	agree	that	a	certain	degree	of	order	and	stability	is	a	necessary	condition	for	
political	life,	and	that	enjoying	security	might	be	a	universal	wish	for	all	human	beings.	But	
now	imagine	Hobbes’	England	(or,	for	that	matter,	Machiavelli’s	Italy)	as	a	country	where	
most	people	were	afflicted	by	enduring	famines	caused	not	by	civil	wars	but	instead	by	the	
greed	and	insensitivity	of	a	powerful,	absolute	sovereign	backed	by	a	merciless	upper	class.	
Imagine	further	that	Hobbes	was	the	son	of	extremely	poor	and	illiterate	parents,	and	that	
only	because	of	an	unlikely	combination	of	the	sheerest	coincidences	he	happened	to	receive	
a	satisfactory	education	and	barely	managed	to	survive	out	of	his	intellectual	skills.	One	
could	expect	the	emergence	of	something	quite	similar	to	class-awareness	in	this	Dickensian	
Hobbes,	and	suspect	that	the	described	circumstances	might	have	affected	Hobbes’	
description	of	the	state	of	nature,	his	conception	of	the	social	contract	and	his	expectations	
concerning	Leviathan.	Perhaps,	if	history	had	been	similar	to	my	fictional	story,	political	
realists	nowadays	would	be	proposing	social	justice	as	the	defining	aim	of	politics.	After	all,	
not	dying	of	starvation	seems	to	be	another	reasonable	candidate	to	the	post	of	a	necessary	
condition	for	political	life.	
	 And	there	are	still	more	candidates.	Why	not	freedom?	In	support	of	this	bid,	we	can	
fancy	a	wealthy	Hobbes	living	in	a	crimeless	Gulf	country	in	which	respect	for	civil	rights	
would	be	absent.	We	can	imagine	him	imprisoned	and	tortured	after	charges	of	atheism,	we	
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can	see	him	watching	how	his	books	burn	in	a	bonfire,	and	so	on.	Would	this	Hobbes	of	
Arabia	not	be	inclined	to	agree	with	Kant	that	preserving	individual	freedom	is	the	main	goal	
of	the	state?	
	 Order	and	security,	justice,	freedom,	well-being:	all	of	them	look	like	reasonable	aims	
for	politics.	But	it	is	doubtful	that	any	of	them	should	be	seen	as	the	defining	goal.	It	seems	
rather	that	one	fundamental	part	of	politics	consists	in	debating	what	goals	ought	to	be	on	
the	list	at	a	given	moment,	as	well	as	their	relative	priority	and	the	precise	meaning	each	
society	ought	to	assign	to	each	of	them.	
	 Geuss	(2008,	22)	partially	agrees.	After	defending	the	realist	view	that	the	main	
purpose	of	politics	is	to	organize	human	action	‘so	as	to	limit	and	control	forms	of	disorder’	
that	people	‘might	find	excessive	or	intolerable’,	he	adds:	‘This	is	a	historically	specific	study	
if	only	because	the	concepts	of	‘order’	and	‘intolerable	disorder’	are	themselves	variable	
magnitudes.’	
	 But	the	problem	is	not	just	one	of	magnitude.	It	is	also	a	matter	of	quality	and	
definition.	For	instance:	what	does	‘intolerable	disorder’	mean?	Some	may	feel	content	with	
defining	the	concept	in	terms	of	physical	violence	and	riots.	Goethe	(1960,	517),	for	instance,	
dared	to	write:	‘I	prefer	committing	an	injustice	to	putting	up	with	disorder.’	It	is	also	
instructive	to	remember	that	the	Latin	verb	meaning	‘bring	peace	to’	or	‘pacify’	(pacare)	can	
be	translated	also	as	‘subdue.’	
	 Something	close	to	this	conception	of	Pax	Romana	was	indeed	what	Hobbes	had	in	
mind	when	he	talked	of	peace	and	order	in	his	Leviathan,	and	this	is	the	conception	echoed	
in	Goethe’s	motto	and	inherited	by	political	realists	from	Weber	to	Williams.8	But	it	is	a	
disputed	conception.	In	recent	times	some	have	contended	that	the	mere	absence	of	physical	
violence	is	not	synonymous	with	peace,9	and	others	have	complained	that	a	conception	of	
security	restricted	to	the	defense	of	the	state	from	external	aggression,	and	the	internal	
	 11	
enforcement	of	law	and	order,	would	be	too	narrow.	Among	the	latter	are	those	(Sen	2000,	
UNDP	1994)	who	have	championed	the	concept	of	‘human	security.’	This	concept	intends	to	
encompass	all	factors	that	make	people	safer:	economic	security,	food	security,	health	
security,	environmental	security,	personal	security,	community	security	and	political	
security	(UNDP	1994,	24-25).	Indeed,	someone	advocating	for	such	a	concept	of	security	
might	turn	the	realists’	concern	for	order	into	the	proposal	of	something	like	a	worldly	
welfare	state,	and	still	take	this	as	the	basic	political	goal.	
	 So	political	realists	are	making	the	same	fundamental	mistake	as	political	moralists:	
all	of	them	select	one	outstanding	value	(typically	justice,	freedom	or	happiness	for	
moralists;	order,	in	the	case	of	realists)	and	advance	it	as	the	substance	of	politics.	Realists	
rightly	point	out	that,	when	doing	so,	moralists	do	not	come	to	terms	with	the	complexity	of	
(contemporary)	societies,	where	different	moral	goals	coexist.	Realists	then	ask	why	
freedom	should	prevail	over	well-being,	or	vice	versa,	if	both	options	are	presumably	
represented	in	society.	But	realists	fail	to	justify	satisfactorily	the	prevalence	of	order	and	
security	over,	say,	justice,	and	they	also	lack	satisfactory	arguments	for	interpreting	order	
and	security	precisely	in	Hobbesian	terms.		
	 Both	moralists	and	realists	postulate	a	substantial	goal	for	politics.	Yet,	do	we	need	to	
do	so?	Obviously,	the	answer	to	this	question	depends	on	our	definition	of	politics.	So	this	is	
what	we	need.	
	
Definitions	and	Legitimacy	
Certain	political	philosophers	refuse	to	define	politics.	See,	for	instance,	Williams	
(2005,	12)	and	Geuss	(2008,	23).	Nevertheless,	both	draw	a	number	of	conclusions	of	their	
loose	characterizations	of	the	political.	It	is	true	that	both	use	the	label	‘political	theory’	to	
refer	to	their	own	work,	and	it	is	true	enough	that	political	science	may	not	need	a	
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demarcation	criterion.	As	a	descriptive	and	explanatory	science,	political	science	has	facts	as	
its	main	input,	and	hence	does	not	need	to	discuss	how	the	concept	of	‘politics’	ought	to	be	
properly	understood:	it	is	enough	to	register	carefully	how	it	is,	in	fact,	understood	by	
different	people	at	different	times	and	places.	Even	the	normative	question	of	the	legitimacy	
can	be	reduced,	for	political	science,	to	the	descriptive	question	of	whether	or	not	a	
particular	institution	is	seen,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	as	legitimate	by	the	relevant	actors.	But	if	
we	wish	to	practice	political	philosophy	(or	we	want	to	prevent	the	reduction	of	political	
theory	to	political	science)	we	certainly	need	a	definition	of	politics,	and	a	clear	demarcation	
from	other	endeavors.	The	search	for	a	demarcation	criterion	may	sound	as	old-fashioned	in	
political	philosophy	as	in	the	philosophy	of	science,	but	we	certainly	need	it	in	order	to	
justify	any	conception	of	political	legitimacy.	
	 As	we	have	seen,	the	problem	of	demarcation	does	not	worry	Geuss,	whose	
conception	of	political	theory	does	not	retain	the	purposes	traditionally	attributed	to	
political	philosophy;	but	it	does	pose	a	problem	for	Williams,	who	intends	to	include	the	
discussion	on	political	legitimacy	in	his	proposal,	and	takes	the	idea	of	legitimacy	as	a	
normative	concept.	At	least,	‘normative	for	us	as	applied	to	our	own	society’	(Williams	2005,	
14).	Now	I	will	show	that	Williams’	conception	of	legitimacy	does	not	work	because	he	lacks	
a	satisfactory	concept	of	the	political.	
	 For	Williams	(2205,	4),	a	state	is	legitimate	if	it	meets	what	he	calls	the	Basic	
Legitimation	Demand	(BLD),	and	BLD	is	met	when	a	state	is	able	to	provide	an	‘acceptable’	
solution	to	the	‘first	political	question,’	i.e.,	the	securing	of	order.	His	proposal	would	not	be	
moralistic	because	BLD	is	not	a	moral,	but	a	distinctively	political	requirement:	
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It	may	be	asked	whether	BLD	is	itself	a	moral	principle.	If	it	is,	it	does	not	represent	a	
morality	which	is	prior	to	politics.	It	is	a	claim	that	is	inherent	in	there	being	such	a	
thing	as	politics	(...)	(Williams	2005,	5)	
	
	 But	how	can	Williams	know	that	BLD	is	‘inherent	in	there	being	such	a	thing	as	
politics’,	if	he	does	not	provide	us	with	a	precise	definition	of	politics?	Indeed,	he	provides	a	
vague	portrayal	based	on	his	idea	of	the	‘first	political	question’,	but,	as	I	said	earlier,	neither	
Hobbes	nor	Williams	explain	persuasively	why	the	problem	of	order	is	the	first	question	to	
be	solved	by	politics,	or	why	order	and	security	have	to	be	understood	precisely	in	
Hobbesian	terms.	
	 Williams	pays	still	another	price	for	lacking	a	satisfactory	definition	of	politics.	He	
predicates	BLD	solely	of	the	state,	and	hence	does	not	conceive	politics	outside	the	state.10	
But	restricting	the	scope	of	the	political	to	the	span	of	the	state	cannot	be	given	for	granted:	
it	is	indeed	conceivable	the	existence	of	political	activity	(pace	Hobbes)	in	societies	without	a	
state.	To	what	sort	of	literature	belong	the	writings	of,	say,	Kropotkin,	when	he	calls	for	a	
society	without	state	and	describes	the	workings	of	such	society?	What	sort	of	activity	would	
the	inhabitants	of	a	hypothetical,	communist	society	perform	when	meeting	in	an	assembly?	
What	are	the	members	of	a	pre-state	society	doing	while	planning	to	attack	a	nearby	tribe?	
Would	that	be	an	instance	of	cooking?	Sports,	perhaps?	If	we	can	conceive	of	politics	without	
the	state,	this	means	that	states	cannot	be	part	of	a	definition	of	politics,	however	vague.	The	
concept	of	state	comes	into	the	stage	only	as	one	of	the	possible	answers	to	one	of	the	
political	questions.		
	 Legitimacy,	normatively	understood,	is	the	central	question	for	political	philosophy,	
but	political	realists	either	shy	away	from	it	(Geuss),	or	provide	a	wanting	account	(Hobbes,	
Williams).	As	for	political	moralists,	nobody	could	charge	them	with	neglecting	the	
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normative	side	of	political	philosophy,	but	they	fail	to	justify	why	political	activity	should	
obey	moral	norms,	and	why	politics	ought	to	be	defined	in	terms	of	precisely	a	certain	moral	
goal	among	the	many	that	are	valued	by	people	in	contemporary	societies.	We	have	already	
discussed	this	problem	in	the	case	of	Kant’s	choice	of	freedom	as	the	main	goal	(or	
constraint)	of	politics.	Habermas	(1996,	32)	shares	with	Kant	the	goal	and	the	objections	
when	he	writes:	‘coercible	laws	must	prove	their	legitimacy	as	laws	of	freedom	in	the	
process	—and	by	the	kind	of	process—	of	lawmaking.’	
	 A	further	problem	shared	by	political	moralists	and	political	realists	concerns	the	
source	of	their	particular	characterization	of	a	given	goal	for	politics.	The	question	is	not	
simply	whether	or	not	politics	must	have	moral	purposes	and	what	these	would	be.	Besides,	
there	is	the	question	of	how	to	understand	each	proposed	goal.	In	this	respect,	it	is	
enlightening	to	look	at	Larmore’s	(2013,	297	ff.)	criticism	of	Cohen	(2008)	on	the	sources	of	
a	correct	understanding	of	justice.	While	political	realists	refuse	to	start	with	ethical	
principles	their	political	proposals	and	prefer	to	look	first	to	real	political	institutions	and	
practices,	Cohen	(2008,	274	ff.)	insists	that	no	normative	conclusion	can	be	derived	from	
facts	alone.	In	the	particular	case	of	justice,	he	writes:	‘we	do	not	learn	what	justice	
fundamentally	is	by	focusing	on	what	it	is	permissible	to	coerce’		(Cohen,	2008,	148).	
Political	philosophy,	then,	should	ascertain	what	justice	is	by	non-empirical	means,	and	then	
discuss	the	applications	of	the	concept,	instead	of	trying	to	discover	it,	inductively,	from	the	
facts.	Larmore	(2013,	298–304)	replies	that	the	nature	of	justice	is	dependent	on	certain	
features	of	the	human	condition,	among	which	the	pervasiveness	of	reasonable	
disagreement	is	especially	relevant,	and	recalls	that	principles	and,	in	general,	reasons	are	
often	fact-dependent.	
	 Nevertheless,	Larmore	shares	with	Cohen	the	conviction	that	political	realism	
deprives	political	philosophy	of	its	normative	force.	For	this	reason,	he	develops	an	
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intermediate	position	between	realism	and	moralism.	Larmore’s	proposal	avoids	realists’	
criticisms	to	political	moralism	by	acknowledging	the	possibility	that	reasonable	people	may	
propose	a	plurality	of	irreconcilable	solutions	to	political	problems.	Besides,	as	we	have	
seen,	he	grants	that	political	philosophy	must	pay	attention	to	empirical	facts	concerning	
human	nature	and	human	societies.	On	the	other	hand,	he	satisfies	the	moralists’	concern	
with	normativity	by	means	of	his	acceptance	that	justice,	and	not	order,	is	the	real	source	of	
legitimacy	in	politics:	only	a	just	order,	would	deserve	to	be	regarded	as	legitimate	by	
political	philosophy	(see	Larmore	2013,	291).	
	 Unfortunately,	Larmore	does	not	explain	persuasively	why	justice	ought	to	be	
included	in	the	definition	of	politics.	His	main	argument	is	that	otherwise	the	normative	
force	of	political	philosophy,	and	hence	a	genuine	concern	with	legitimacy,	would	be	lost.	At	
first	sight	it	would	seem	that	he	is	accepting	Kant’s	assumption	that	the	sole	source	of	
genuine	normativity	lies	in	the	realm	of	morality,	but	Larmore	dodges	the	problems	of	
moralism	by	pointing	out	that	he	is	not	talking	of	justice	as	a	purely	moral	ideal,	but	of	
political	justice	(Larmore	2013,	292-294).	Political	justice,	although	anchored	in	moral	
considerations,	lays	out	the	conditions	that	make	political	life	possible,	and	so	marks	off	
politics	as	a	relatively	autonomous	realm.	
	 A	political	realist	would	object	that	this	solution	is	still	too	moralistic.	My	objection	is	
different:	why	does	(moral	or	political)	justice,	rather	than	freedom,	equality,	well-being	or	
security,	provide	the	substantial	goal	(in	the	vocabulary	of	the	‘enactment	model’),	or	the	
substantial	constraint	(as	the	‘structural	model’	would	see	it)	for	politics?	
	 The	need	of	a	substantial	element	in	the	definition	makes	sense	if	(i)	one	wants	to	
preserve	normativity	in	political	philosophy,	and	(ii)	one	grants	that	genuine	normativity	is	
categorical,	not	hypothetical.	My	own	proposal	sympathizes	with	(i)	but	rejects	(ii).	It	begins	
with	the	statement	that	politics	is	an	instance	of	instrumental	rationality	and	that	political	
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philosophy	is	a	fully	normative	enterprise	although	it	deals	only	with	hypothetical	
imperatives.	
	
Political	Minimalism:	Politics	as	Collective	Instrumental	Rationality	
A	group	of	visitors	arriving	to	a	city	may	start	asking	something	very	vague	like	‘what	
shall	we	do?’	This	question	may	be	difficult	to	answer.	Typically,	they	have	neither	the	same	
interests,	nor	the	same	needs,	nor	exactly	the	same	beliefs,	including	moral	beliefs,	but	they	
find	some	advantage	in	sticking	together,	so	they	need	to	coordinate	their	actions.	They	are	
involved	in	a	collective	exercise	of	instrumental	rationality,	and	such	exercises	are	never	
easy.	From	time	to	time,	to	make	things	even	worse,	a	moral	question	arises.	The	group,	for	
instance,	meets	a	beggar	or	finds	a	brothel,	and	someone	asks:	‘what	should	we	do?’	The	
group	then	needs	to	agree	on	a	procedure	for	facing	such	situations.	If	the	group	is	very	
homogeneous	regarding	moral	opinions	(for	instance,	if	the	group	is	a	small	group	of	nuns)	
they	might	see	the	answer	given	by	any	of	them	to	one	of	those	questions	as	tantamount	to	a	
collective	decision.	But	the	bigger	and	the	less	homogeneous	the	group	is,	the	likelihood	
increases	that	they	need	to	set	up	a	different	procedure.	For	instance,	the	group	might	leave	
(certain)	moral	questions	entirely	to	individuals	or	decide	what	to	do	by	majority	vote.	In	
any	case,	a	group	that	settles	a	procedure	for	dealing	with	the	internal	diversity	of	moral	
codes	has	discovered	that,	from	the	political	point	of	view,	morality	is	encompassed	by	
politics.	
	 I	propose	to	view	a	political	community	like	a	big	enough	group	(bigger,	say,	than	an	
extended	family,	but	not	necessarily	much	more)	that	needs	to	answer	from	time	to	time	the	
question	‘what	shall	we	do?’	And	politics	would	be	the	exercise	of	collective	instrumental	
rationality	that	such	groups	need	to	implement	from	time	to	time.	According	to	this	view,	the	
essence	of	politics	is	not	provided	by	a	fixed	(moral	or	non-moral)	aim	or	constraint.	Instead,	
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it	consists	in	the	search	for	adequate	means	to	satisfy	those	goals	pursued	in	fact	by	the	
members	of	the	political	community.	Politics	intends	to	answer	the	general	question	‘what	
shall	we	do?’	in	a	manner	that	would	be,	ideally,	acceptable	for	all,	although	in	reality	it	
nearly	never	will.	
	 I	am	replacing,	then,	the	dichotomy	political	moralism/political	realism	for	another,	in	
which	one	pole	(‘political	substantialism’)	would	encompass	both	moralism	and	realism	as	
far	as	both	postulate	one	(although	not	the	same)	substantial	goal	for	politics.	The	other	pole	
can	be	called	‘political	minimalism’	because	it	does	not	intend	to	fix	the	ultimate	goal(s)	of	
politics	and	let	the	specification	of	such	goals	in	the	hands	of	the	people.	It	leaves	the	scope	
of	possible	political	proposals	very	open,	and	hence	it	is,	in	principle,	compatible	with	most	
of	them.	For	a	political	minimalist,	the	range	of	acceptable	political	proposals	will	be	reduced	
not	as	a	result	of	philosophical	speculation	but	as	a	result	of	empirical	argument.	The	crucial	
question	is:	what	political	ideologies,	general	projects,	or	particular	decisions	are	more	likely	
to	realize,	in	every	context,	the	goals	of	the	people?	Political	minimalism	reserves,	then,	a	
more	limited,	though	still	tough,	set	of	tasks	for	political	philosophers	than	other	schools	
(mainly	metaphilosophical	tasks,	like	the	one	undertaken	in	the	present	essay).	
Contrastingly,	it	assigns	a	heavy	burden	to	economists,	political	scientists,	engineers,	and	
other	bearers	of	scientific	and	technical	knowledge.	Political	scientists	and	politicians	will	
face	also	a	hard	work	designing	efficient	ways	to	find	out	what	people	really	want	and	
figuring	out	how	to	make	people’s	set	of	goals	internally	coherent	and	feasible.	
	 Besides,	political	minimalism	does	not	need	to	suppose	that	the	legitimacy	of	political	
institutions	is	provided	by	a	founding	principle	(e.g.	utility)	or	by	a	founding	situation	(e.g.,	a	
contract,	either	explicit,	tacit	or	hypothetical).	Politics	is	rather	something	we	meet	in	media	
res,	a	bundle	of	practices	and	institutions	that	we	try	to	understand	and	transform	for	the	
better.	
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	 Once	I	have	sketched	my	proposal,	I	am	sure	that	many	objections	come	quickly	to	
the	mind	of	the	reader.	I	will	now	try	to	answer	those	that	I	can	foresee,	an	exercise	that	will	
make	my	stance	clearer,	I	hope.	
	
Objections	and	Rejoinders	
	
1.	Where	does	your	definition	come	from?	Is	it	not	as	arbitrary	to	define	politics	as	you	do	as	it	
is	to	define	it	with	reference	to	a	certain	political	goal?	
	 My	definition	is	a	hypothesis.	It	intends	to	be	compatible	with	the	intuitions	most	of	
us	share	about	politics,	and	this	aim	is	easier	to	accomplish	if	the	characterization	of	the	
political	remains	minimal.	As	any	hypothesis,	it	is	open	to	revision	if	persuasive	
counterexamples	are	found.	The	method	of	adjustment	between	intuition	and	definition	has	
to	be,	I	assume,	a	holistic	method	close	to	the	method	of	‘reflective	equilibrium’	devised	by	J.	
Rawls.	
	 On	the	other	hand,	I	would	not	say	that	the	definitions	(or	loose	characterizations,	
depending	on	the	case)	provided	by	political	moralists	and	political	realists	are	arbitrary;	
but	they	fail	to	accomodate	certain	facts	(like	the	ubiquity	of	moral	disagreement,	in	the	case	
of	political	moralists)	and	intuitions	(like	the	possibility	of	politics	without	a	state,	in	the	
case	of	political	realists).	My	proposal	is	advanced	as	a	hypothesis	that	helps	to	make	better	
sense	of	this	activity	called	‘politics.’	
	
2.	Why	not	include	the	state	in	the	definition	of	politics?	Do	you	seriously	believe	that	politics	is	
possible	outside	the	state?	
	 It	depends	on	what	you	understand	by	‘possible.’	If	you	mean	‘conceivable,’	it	
certainly	is.	Many	anarchists	and	communists	firmly	believe	it	is	possible.	Besides,	
	 19	
anthropologists	and	historians	provide	many	examples	of	activities	that	seem	natural	to	call	
‘political’	but	take	place	in	societies	without	a	state.	If	you	mean	‘feasible	in	the	present	
world,’	it	may	be	sound	to	argue	that	political	life	is	nowadays	impossible	outside	the	states,	
but	this	is	an	empirical	question	not	to	be	settled	by	conceptual	analysis.	Political	
minimalism,	as	such,	does	not	entail	a	commitment	either	to	the	unavoidability	of	states	or	
to	their	desirability.	In	case	there	is	evidence	that	political	communities	can	survive	both	as	
states	or	as	stateless	societies,	the	political	minimalist	will	ask	which	of	these	two	options	is	
more	likely	to	help	people	to	attain	their	goals.	
	
3.	Does	political	minimalism	entail	an	option	for	‘radical’	democracy?	
	 No.	Political	minimalism	only	demands	the	choice	of	those	decision-making	
procedures	and	structural	arrangements	that	presumably	will	facilitate	the	realization	of	
people’s	aims.	Many	would	argue	that	this	purpose	will	be	more	easily	attained	by	some	
variety	of	what	we	know	as	‘democracy,’	and	some	may	add	that	some	form	of	participatory,	
direct	or	‘radical’	democracy	performs	better	in	this	respect	than	representative	democracy.	
But,	again,	these	are	empirical	debates	in	regard	to	which	political	minimalism	itself	remains	
neutral.	
	
4.	Is	political	minimalism	tantamount	to	populism?	
	 No.	You	may	be	afraid	that	political	minimalism	can	justify	too	easily	the	
implementation	of	decisions	that	can	be	‘popular’	at	a	given	moment,	like	harassing	the	Jews,	
expelling	the	foreigners,	castrating	the	rapers	or	expropriating	the	rich.	But	when	political	
minimalism	ask	governments	and	parliaments	to	take	into	account	people’s	aims,	it	is	not	
demanding	that	governments	and	parliaments	try	to	satisfy	every	goal	that	every	individual	
cherises	at	every	moment.	The	purpose	is	to	promote	an	internally	coherent,	relatively	long-
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lasting	set	of	aims	accepted	by	most	people	in	a	political	community.	It	is	always	difficult	to	
have	a	fair	picture	of	such	a	set,	hard	to	establish	the	hierarchy	of	the	political	goals	included	
in	it,	and	even	harder	to	agree	on	the	measures	that	are	most	appropriate	in	order	to	
promote	those	goals.	But	such	difficult	tasks	are	well	beyond	the	responsibilities	of	a	
metaphilosophical	stance	like	political	minimalism.	What	a	defender	of	political	minimalism	
can	say	is	that	members	of	a	government	or	parliament	should	not	always	feel,	e.g.,	
compelled	to	expel	the	foreigners	simply	because	a	majority	in	the	political	society	wish	this	
at	a	particular	moment,	as	far	as	those	public	servants	can	argue	that	such	demand	is	
inconsistent	with	a	stronger	wish	for	economic	prosperity,	for	example.	
	 Nevertheless,	it	is	true	that	political	minimalism	has	no	ressources	to	distinguish	
between	values	and	desires,	or	between	noble	and	nasty	political	ends.	This	means	that,	in	
spite	of	the	above	provisos,	the	internaly	coherent	set	of	aims	of	a	political	community	may	
command	actions	that	are	unacceptable	for	those	who	have	to	implement	them,	or	for	the	
philosopher.	Still,	it	follows	from	political	minimalism	that	civil	servants	must	devise	
adequate	means	to	achieve	that	set	of	aims,	even	if	they	reject	it	for	moral	or	other	reasons.	
For	remember	that	political	minimalism,	like	political	realism,	proclaims	the	supremacy	of	
politics	over	morals	from	the	political	point	of	view.	Nevertheless,	political	minimalism	also	
grants	the	priority	of	ethics	over	politics	from	the	moral	point	of	view.	So	a	civil	servant	who	
believes	that	his	or	her	principles	are	incompatible	with	the	political	aims	of	his	or	her	
fellow	citizens	perhaps	should	resign.	And	then,	as	one	citizen	among	many,	he	or	she	might	
try	to	change	the	mind	of	the	others,	perhaps	with	the	help	of	the	philosopher.		
	
5.	But	people	also	argue	on	ultimate	ends,	don’t	they?	
	 Yes,	they	do.	People	discuss	constantly,	for	instance,	whether	freedom	should	be	
limited	for	the	sake	of	social	justice,	or	vice	versa,	and	to	what	degree.	People	also	discuss	
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what	ought	to	be	understood	by	freedom,	justice,	well-being,	and	so	on.	Political	ideologies	
typically	favor	certain	aims	over	others	and	propose	means	to	achieve	the	favored	aims.	
Defenders	of	ideologies	not	only	try	to	improve	the	internal	coherence	of	their	proposals	by	
giving	a	hierarchical	order	to	the	aims	they	pursue	and	comparing	the	effectiveness	of	the	
strategies	to	achieve	them.	Sometimes	people	confront	the	merits	of	rival	ideologies.	Since,	
in	fact,	people	in	contemporary	societies	hold	different	views	on	political	goals,	ideological	
debate	is	unavoidable	and	necessary.	
	 Politicians,	political	scientists,	and	philosophers	also	participate	in	the	debate,	with	
the	same	right	as	any	other	citizen.	And	they	can	sensibly	claim	that	they	bring	to	the	
discussion	more	experience,	information	or	conceptual	accuracy	than	the	average	person.	
	 Discussions	on	ends	are	useful.	Not	just	because	the	internal	coherence	of	the	set	of	
goals	pursued	by	a	political	community	can	increase,	and	the	hierarchy	among	them	may	
become	more	explicit;	also	because	empirical	information	concerning,	for	instance,	the	
feasibility	of	the	goals	can	improve	the	quality	of	the	set.	
	 A	political	minimalist	doesn’t	deny	all	this,	but	insists	that	the	task	of	politicians	and	
public	servants	is	not	to	impose	some	political	goals	on	people	(perhaps	under	the	influence	
of	moral	philosophers),	but	to	find	the	means	for	realizing	the	set	of	goals	chosen	by	the	
people.		
	
6.	Is	political	minimalism	leaving	any	room	for	political	philosophy?	
	 I	have	claimed	above	that	political	philosophy	has	to	be	a	normative	endeavor,	if	it	
strives	to	have	something	to	add	to	political	science	and	other	social	sciences.	But	some	
would	fear	that	this	normative	vocation	is	in	danger	if	political	philosophy	does	not	
prescribe	the	goals	of	politics.	Isn’t	this	restriction	tantamount	to	relativism?	
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	 No.	Political	minimalism	is	not	a	relativistic	stance,	neither	regarding	politics	nor	
regarding	political	philosophy.	
	 First	of	all,	politics	is	a	normative	activity	as	far	as	it	searches	adequate	means	for	
people’s	ends.	There	is	no	room	for	relativism	here:	(i)	Political	actors	may	be	right	or	wrong	
concerning	the	aims	of	the	people,	but	there	is	a	truth	on	this	matter	waiting	to	be	
discovered,	be	it	ever	discovered	or	not.	(ii)	Besides,	political	actors	can	be	right	or	wrong	
when	choosing	the	means	for	those	ends,	because	there	are	strategies	more	adequate	than	
others.	Although	Kantians	may	long	for	categorical	rationality,	hypothetical	rationality	also	
provides	inequivocal	normative	judgements	and	prescriptions	once	the	ends	are	settled.		
	 Indeed,	a	political	minimalist	can	agree	with	a	political	realist	in	acknowledging	that	
there	can	be	more	than	one	suitable	way	to	achieve	an	aim.	This	is	why	I	have	not	talked	of	
‘the	best	means’	but	of	‘adequate	means’	for	people’s	aims.	But,	again,	this	does	not	
ammount	to	relativism	or	to	relinquishing	the	normative	concept	of	rationality.	True,	it	calls	
for	a	not	very	stringent	characterization	of	rational	political	actors.	In	particular,	it	does	not	
require	that	the	political	actor	chooses	a	strategy	that	‘maximizes’	the	likelihood	of	attaining	
a	goal,	but	simply	one	of	the	strategies	that	will	likely	promote	that	goal.11	
	 Second,	political	philosophy	is	normative	because	it	provides	a	criterion	to	tell	good	
politics	from	bad	politics:	good	politics	provides	good	means	for	the	ends	favored	by	people,	
while	bad	politics	fails	to	do	so,	either	because	political	actors	don’t	care	about	people’s	
goals	or	because	they	choose	ineffective	means.	This	is	not,	maybe,	a	normative	task	of	much	
glamor,	but	it	is	certainly	a	normative	task,	so	political	philosophy	is	still	a	normative	
discipline.	
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1	I	thank	Lilian	Bermejo-Luque	for	her	insightful	suggestions	and	her	support	while	writing	
and	revising	the	manuscript.	This	article	is	a	result	of	the	research	project	FFI2016-79000-P,	
financed	by	the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Economy,	Industry	and	Competitiveness.	Some	
applications	of	the	main	thesis	of	this	article	to	different	fields	can	be	found	at	Rodríguez-
Alcázar	2017a,	2017b,	and	forthcoming.	
2	Williams	2005	does	not	distinguish	between	political	theory	and	political	philosophy.	This	
is	common	among	political	realists:	see,	for	instance,	Geuss	2008,	16.	To	prevent	
ambiguities,	I	will	avoid	the	term	‘political	theory’	and	will	talk	instead	of	‘political	
philosophy,’	as	opposed	to	‘political	science.’	The	former	would	be	mainly	normative,	and	
the	latter	rather	descriptive	and	explanatory.	
3	I	borrow	the	term	from	Quine	(1969,	83),	who	talks	analogously	of	a	‘reciprocal	
containment’	of	epistemology	and	ontology.	
4	More	precisely,	although	freedom	would	be	the	outstanding	goal	of	politics,	Kant	(2006,	
45)	admits	that	there	are	two	more	grounding	a	priori	principles:	equality	and	independence.	
On	the	other	hand,	although	I	summarize	Kant’s	political	philosophy	using	the	terminology	
of	goals,	sometimes	it	is	more	adequate	to	talk	of	moral	constraints.	In	other	words,	Kant	
often	looks	closer	to	the	structural	than	to	the	enactment	model.	
5	Behemoth,	also	known	as	The	Long	Parliament.	
6	Hobbes,	who	described	himself	as	a	fearful	person,	stated:	‘my	mother	gave	birth	to	twins:	
myself	and	fear.’	Quoted	by	Gert	(2010,	1).	
7	For	a	reading	of	Machiavelli	as	a	‘mild’	political	realist,	see	Skinner	1978.	
	 26	
																																																																																																																																																																																					
8	Weber	1921	defines	politics	not	in	terms	of	its	goals,	but	of	its	means.	In	particular,	he	
characterizes	a	political	association	by	its	capacity	to	impose	its	rules	by	force,	and	defines	
the	state	as	that	political	association	who	monopolizes	the	legitimate	use	of	force.	But,	as	
Larmore	(2013,	285)	rightly	points	out,	this	is	equivalent	to	saying	that	the	primary	political	
goal	is	‘creating	and	maintaining	social	order,	through	coercion	if	necessary.’	
9	Galtung	1969,	for	instance,	coined	the	term	‘structural	violence’	to	refer	to	an	‘avoidable	
impairment	of	fundamental	human	needs’,	caused	by	a	social	structure	or	institution.	
10	He	writes:	‘(...)	if	such	a	demand	[BLD]	genuinely	exists,	is	implicit	in	the	very	idea	of	a	
legitimate	state,	and	so	is	inherent	in	any	politics’	(Williams	2005,		8).	
11	The	natural	conception	of	rationality	and	the	political	actor	for	political	minimalism	are	
hence	those	of	a	‘bounded	rationality’	and	a	‘satisfactionist’	agent,	as	defined	by	Simon	1983.	
